Afghanistan's National Action Plan: 'a wish list of many dreams' by Frogh, Wazhma
Afghanistan's National Action Plan: 'a wish list of many dreams'
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104030/
Version: Published Version
Monograph:
Frogh, Wazhma (2017) Afghanistan's National Action Plan: 'a wish list of many 
dreams'. Women, Peace and Security Working Paper Series (10/2017). Centre for 
Women Peace and Security, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
London, UK. 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
AFGHANISTAN’S NATIONAL ACTION 
PLAN: ‘A WISH LIST OF MANY DREAMS’
Afghanistan is a country that for the 
past 50 years has experienced ongoing 
violence of many different kinds: Soviet 
occupation, civil war between warlords 
and tribal leaders, the oppressive regime 
of the Taliban, the bombing by the USA in 
retaliation for the 9/11 attacks, and a NATO 
counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism 
operation ongoing for the past 16 years. The 
Taliban insurgency continues to take Afghan 
lives on a daily basis and has shrunk public 
spaces for freedom and civil rights across 
the country, for all of the population but 
especially women and children.1
The first National Action Plan (NAP) on 
Women, Peace and Security in Afghanistan is 
therefore of great importance and relevance 
to the lives of Afghan women. The President 
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
launched the NAP in June 2015 with a 
clear commitment by the government to 
ensure that women have a strong role in 
and contribution to the governance and 
development of war-torn Afghanistan.2
The NAP adoption comes at a critical time 
in Afghanistan, as Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) is taking shape, with the involvement 
of NATO, USA, UK, and many other donors 
in Afghanistan. Only 1 per cent of the total 
security forces of over 350,000 personnel 
in the police, intelligence, and army are 
women. (This 1 per cent, however, face 
tremendous challenges and backlash within 
the system and from the public as well).3
A national peace programme is being 
explored by the government of the country. 
In early 2017, the Afghan government 
agreed on a political peace programme that 
continued the mandate of the High Peace 
Council,4 which was established in 2010. 
As a result of continued pressure and lobby 
from women’s groups, the government 
ensured at least 20 per cent participation 
of women leaders as members of the 
High Peace Council. However, meaningful 
participation still requires women leaders to 
influence the peace agendas.
The Afghan NAP is a beginning, a foundation 
for the government’s obligation to respond 
to continued civil society pressure and 
lobbying by women’s groups and female 
peace activists. However, the implementation 
of the NAP is yet to be operationalised at 
the national and provincial levels.
This working paper analyses the 
development of the Afghanistan National 
Action Plan and explores the challenges 
around its implementation in the context of 
a continued military conflict in Afghanistan.
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+ 
The women of Afghanistan supported their husbands and fathers during the Anti-Soviet 
Union national resistance by taking food to the battlegrounds, taking care of the children 
and the elderly on their behalf but became the first targets when the Mujahidin Islamic 
revolution took into the streets of Kabul and we witnessed rapes, kidnappings, murder 
of young and old women during the civil war and then the Taliban denied our existence 
completely but we started a new chapter in 2001 and the international frameworks and laws 
have been helpful in establishing our existence once again on the streets of Kabul.
A female MP from the 1986 term of the Afghan parliament
Wazhma Frogh
21 Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Events 
of 2016”, in World Report 2017 (New York, 
NY: Human Rights Watch, 2017), https://
www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-
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2 “Launch Ceremony of the National Action 
Plan on UNSCR 1325 - Women, Peace and 
Security”, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 June 2015, 
http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/launch-ceremony-
of-the-national-action-plan-on-unscr-1325-
women-peace-and-security
3 NATO, “Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF)”, Media Backgrounder, October 
2013, https://www.nato.int/nato_static/
assets/pdf/pdf_2013_10/20131018_131022-
MediaBackgrounder_ANSF_en.pdf. See 
also Andrea Ackerman, “Gender in Security 
Sector Reform: The Case of Afghanistan”, 
http://www.academia.edu/21468147/
Gender_in_Security_Sector_Reform_The_
Case_of_Afghanistan
4 For more information about Afghanistan’s 
High Peace Council, see http://www.hpc.org.
af/english/index.php
5 For a timeline on women’s rights in 
Afghanistan, see http://www.pbs.org/wnet/
women-war-and-peace/uncategorized/
timeline-of-womens-rights-in-afghanistan/
AFGHAN WOMEN AND 
THE AFGHAN WAR
Women have been and will continue to 
be at the forefronts of insurgency, violent 
extremism, and radicalisation in Afghanistan; 
they have defended peace at homes, in 
communities, and within society at large, 
but remain unheard, their efforts largely 
unrecognised.
Looking at the past 50 years of history, 
Afghanistan has suffered the Soviet Union 
invasion, the resistance movement against 
the Russians, the Civil War, the Taliban 
regime, and a new era post 9/11.5 The 
country has continuously been at war and 
the social fabric of the society has been 
ruined. Violence replaced all previous 
cultural norms of the country.
While the story of the Afghan woman 
is the story of a victim in the eyes of the 
international media, Afghan women 
played different roles at different times 
throughout history. Women were the family 
supporters and household caretakers during 
the resistance movement (Jihad) against 
Soviet invasion until the 1990s, although 
they faced brutal abuse and treatment 
during the Civil War of 1991-1994. The 
war factions raped women, assaulted 
them on the streets, married them by 
force, trafficked them into neighbouring 
countries and abroad, and established a 
rigid prohibition on women being outside 
of the home. This treatment became even 
more lethal during the Taliban regime (1994-
2001), which banned women completely 
from appearing in public. The Taliban forced 
women to marry their fighters, took them 
away from their families, and prevented 
education and employment for all kinds 
of women. Women were largely forgotten 
by society.
However, the story of Afghan women 
changed in 2002. The new era of 
international intervention in Afghanistan 
enabled a relatively supportive environment 
for the women of Afghanistan. In 2002, 
the first Women’s Summit, held in Brussels, 
brought together Afghan women from 
different countries and mobilised them for 
inclusion in the new government structures 
and the establishment of the first Ministry 
of Women’s Affairs as part of the interim 
and transitional administration until 2004. 
Women took the opportunity and mobilised 
in masses to include their rights in the 2004 
Constitution of the country and achieved 
gender equality within the Constitution. 
The 25 per cent quotas of seats for women 
in parliament enabled thousands of women 
leaders to run as representatives of their 
provinces and join the parliament in 2005 
and in 2010; currently there are 69 women 
serving in the Afghan parliament as the 
representatives of the people (see Table 1).
Thousands of girls returned to basic and 
higher education and hundreds of them 
were able to study abroad as a result of 
international scholarships. For the first time, 
the perpetrators of violence against women 
received punishment as legislated in the 
Elimination of Violence against Women 
(EVAW) law in the country, which gave hope 
to millions of women suffering different 
kinds of violence and discrimination.
Since 2009, however, the Taliban have 
regrouped and revived their movement 
across the country. Their first targets were 
girl’s schools, women’s clinics, female 
politicians, female government employees, 
female doctors and teachers, and women’s 
media. Since then, the space for women’s 
inclusion in public life has again shrunk 
drastically and the threats of the Taliban have 
taken many of the achievements backwards.
+ 
Women have been and will continue to be at the 
forefronts of insurgency, violent extremism and 
radicalisation in Afghanistan; they have defended peace 
at homes, in communities, and within society at large, 
but remain unheard, their efforts largely unrecognised.
6 Bakhtar Safi “Taliban ban women from 
shopping in Kapisa’s Tagab”, Pajhwok 
Afghan News, 8 September 2017, https://
www.pajhwok.com/en/2017/09/08/taliban-
ban-women-shopping-kapisa’s-tagab
7 Research conducted by the Women & 
Peace Studies Organization (WPSO) can be 
accessed online at www.wpso-afg.org. Hard 
copies of the WPS Forum reports may be 
obtained directly from WPSO.
8 See the case study from 3 provinces on 
systems conflict analysis done in Afghan 
Women’s Network, Women and Peace 
Studies Organization, and Women 
Knowledge and Leadership Organization, 
Understanding Local Conflicts: Case Study 
from Helmand, Logar and Nangarhar 
Provinces: System Conflict Analysis, August 
2017, http://wpso-afg.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/08/Conflict-analysis-of-3-
provinces.pdf
9 For more on ISIS in Nangrahar see Masood 
Saifullah, “Nangarhar: Gateway to 
Afghanistan for ‘Islamic State’”, DW, 30 
December 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/
nangarhar-gateway-to-afghanistan-for-
islamic-state/a-18952201
10 See also Abdul Matin Sahak and Hamid 
Shalizi, “Attackers kill dozens of Afghan 
villagers in northern province”, Reuters, 
6 August 2017, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-afghanistan-islamic-state/attackers-
kill-dozens-of-afghan-villagers-in-northern-
province-idUSKBN1AM0OG
11 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of Human 
Rights and Women’s International Affairs, 
Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on 
UNSCR 1325 – Women, Peace, and Security, 
2015-2022 (Kabul, Afghanistan: Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, June 2015), available 
online at https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/
default/files/wps-afghanistan_national_
action_plan_1325_0.pdf
The ongoing war isn’t fought on the borders, 
far away from communities. The war 
manifests in explosions in the markets, in the 
farms, in schools and at homes. Women are 
the first targets of this insurgency. When the 
Taliban assert their presence in a community, 
the first impact is that girl’s schools are 
closed and that women are warned not to 
come out of homes.6 There is no clear line 
between enemy and combatant because 
the sons and husbands of the women who 
joined the insurgency and participated in 
the destruction of homes and villages also 
hold legitimate grievances that drive them 
towards violence and insurgency.
Research with women leaders in Provincial 
Peace Councils from 2012-2016 clearly 
showed that the Taliban and militants for 
the anti-government activities easily recruit 
the young men in their communities.7 Many 
mothers of these young boys share with 
women at the Provincial Peace Councils not 
just that these young boys need employment 
and income, but that sentiments of justice 
are strong ‘push and pull’ factors among 
them. The weak governance, abuse of the 
police and armed forces in a community, 
and lack of inclusion in the local and 
national processes that impact young boys’ 
lives, are key in the recruitment processes 
into the insurgency.8 Meanwhile, women 
as mothers and wives of Taliban militants, 
and the soldiers that defend against these 
militants, continue to suffer as they lose 
their loved ones on daily basis.
As ISIS affiliates are emerging in different 
parts of the country, their brutalities against 
women and girls have also shocked the 
country. In the eastern region of Nangrahar 9 
in 2016 and 2017, a number of women and 
girls went missing after the districts were 
attacked and taken over by ISIS affiliates. 
Families didn’t even share the news with 
their neighbours because they were scared 
and felt ‘dishonoured’.
Unconfirmed reports to the Women and 
Peace Studies Organization (WPSO) suggested 
that, in early August 2017, a group of ISIS 
affiliates and Taliban attacked Mirzawlang 
of Sarepul in the north, and took away 
over 47 girls between the ages of 11-22 
years old.10 The families and the provincial 
government authorities continue to deny their 
disappearance because ‘girls are considered 
family honour and if they are taken away 
a family honour is taken away and the 
families don’t want to admit [it]’. The above 
analysis and description of the context in 
which Afghan women and girls live on a daily 
basis provides a baseline to understanding 
the importance, as well as relevance, of the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1325 (UNSCR 1325) agenda for Women, 
Peace and Security in Afghanistan.
AFGHANISTAN‘S 
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN 
ON UNSCR 132511
In the context of extensive international 
engagement in Afghanistan since 2001, 
women’s groups and activists have worked 
hard to engage themselves in national 
reconstruction and governance structures. 
Since international organisations and 
actors worked with the women’s groups 
and organisations, the principles of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) and UNSCR 1325 were already 
incorporated into the women’s participation 
and empowerment programmes, shown 
by the many laws and policies adopted 
Provincial 
Council
Lower House 
Parliament
Upper House 
Parliament 
No of women 296 69 27
Total members 2,591 249 102
Table 1: Number of women in the Afghan parliament in 2017.
4to protect women’s rights since 2001 (see 
Figure 1). Even in the absence of an official 
NAP, Afghan women mobilised themselves 
in the Constitution drafting processes, in 
legislative equality, and achieved many 
other accomplishments for women’s 
rights in the country. In 2009 when the 
group of women learnt about the behind 
the scenes talks with the Taliban, the 
women’s groups campaigned for inclusive 
and transparent peace processes and 
ensured that the Afghanistan Peace and 
Reintegration Program that was adopted 
at the Afghanistan London Conference in 
2010 included women’s perspectives.12
All the laws, policies, and plans of the 
government listed in Figure 1 are influenced 
by CEDAW, especially the National Action 
Plan for the Women of Afghanistan, though 
this plan was never implemented fully. 
Women’s groups and activists mobilised 
en masse during the adoption of the 2004 
National Constitution to ensure that the law 
addressed gender equality before the law 
and effectively enshrined the government’s 
obligation to advance women’s access to 
health, education, job opportunities, and 
family welfare. Likewise, CEDAW articles 
were utilised during the drafting process of 
the country’s first Elimination of Violence 
against Women Law during 2008/09 and 
many forms of violations against women 
that had not been criminalised before (in 
the 1970s Penal Code) were recognised 
as crimes against women including rape. 
Afghanistan submitted its first report in 
2013 to the CEDAW committee.
Afghanistan’s NAP was formalised as a result 
of lobbying work by the women’s groups 
and organisations. The Afghan government 
initiated the process of consultations for the 
NAP in 2011 by working with a number 
of women’s organisations and activists 
to establish a consultative process at the 
national and provincial levels. There were 
two phases to the process: the consultation 
and drafting phase; and the finalisation and 
adoption phase.
12 United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan, “Communiqué of ‘Afghanistan: 
The London Conference’”, January 2010, 
https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/
files/Communique%20of%20London%20
Conference%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf
1  Afghan Constitution with Gender 
Equality provisions 
2  Elimination of Violence against 
Women Law (EVAW)
3  National Action Plan for Women of 
Afghanistan (NAPWA) (2008 – 2018)
4  Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS)
5  Family Law
6  Regulation on women shelters or 
Women Protection Centers 
7  Policy to increase girls’ enrolment  
in schools
8  Law on guardianship of  
orphaned children
9  National Economic  
Empowerment Program
10  Procedure for the prevention  
of discrimination
11  Amendment of some of the 
provisions in the Civil Servants Law  
in favour of women
12  National Strategy for Elimination 
of Violence against Women and its 
Implementation Plan
13  Modification of Electoral Law with 
a view to gender equality (National 
Unity Government)
14  Adoption of regulation for the 
prevention of sexual harassment 
(National Unity Government) 
15  Anti-Harassment Law 
16  Policy to improve female  
prisoner’s access to justice  
(National Unity Government).
Figure 1: List of the laws and policies developed for women’s rights since 2001.
Moreover, the female members of the 
Provincial Peace Councils (PPCs) who 
worked for peacebuilding in their provinces 
were not consulted in a systematic and 
targeted manner. Some of them ended up in 
the consultation process at the regional level 
because they happened to have another 
position besides being a member of the 
PPC, while the rest of them continue to 
remain unaware of the Afghan NAP and 
the processes involved.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), with 
funding from the Finnish government and 
technical expertise of UN Women, initiated 
the drafting process; as the agenda of WPS 
is new to Afghanistan, the Ministry lacked 
skills and capabilities to ensure that the 
consultation processes were transparent 
and inclusive of all relevant actors and 
agencies. The process of consultations 
and then drafting also did not include a 
clear assessment of the women’s issues and 
policy-level priorities of the government 
within the WPS agenda and this resulted 
in the drafting of an Afghan NAP that does 
not have a baseline assessment. Successful 
achievement of its milestones and indicators 
will not be possible without a proper 
baseline assessment. For example, one of 
the security sector indicators includes a 10 
per cent increase of women in the police 
force. However, in the absence of a baseline, 
it is impossible to measure an increase.
While women’s engagement in the police 
and security sector is a priority for the 
women’s movement in the country, the 
plan lacks clear procedures on how to 
increase the number of women in the 
security sector, and how to ensure a safe 
and enabling environment for women in 
police and army that should include their 
recruitment, retention, promotion, capacity 
building, and protection mechanisms.
Another issue that emerged during the 
drafting process is the lack of a monitoring 
and evaluation system that needed to 
be embedded within the Afghan NAP. 
The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 
Consultation and  
drafting phase
The Afghan NAP officially claims to have 
followed a robust consultation process across 
the country, consulting with many relevant 
actors and agencies. However, many women’s 
organisations and groups are still critical of 
the process. They believe only a small group 
of people were engaged and consulted. The 
process of consultations evolved around the 
elite women in Kabul and in major provinces 
where the security situation allowed for 
consultations to be held. Provinces that have 
war and/or insurgency going on could not be 
part of the consultations, like the southern 
region of Loya Kandahar that includes 
Kandhar, Zabul, Uruzgan, and Helmand. Only 
the Afghan Women’s Network, a network 
of around 120 women’s organisations, was 
invited formally to join the process and many 
groups and organisations that were not part 
of the Network remained excluded.
Nevertheless, a steering committee was 
established at the Deputy Minister level, 
comprising representatives from all the 
ministries and agencies that are part of the 
Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda 
(these include security sector ministries, the 
High Peace Council, Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs, the education sector, and the 
development sector) and this committee 
participated in the drafting and consultation 
process. The consultation mainly took place 
in the provincial capitals and in urban areas, 
again as a result of the lack of mobility and 
security challenges in more remote regions 
of the country.
The on-the-ground realities for women living 
under insurgency and under rule of, or threats 
of attack from, the Taliban are excluded from 
the Afghan NAP because the consultations 
were not held in those areas due to the 
manifest security challenges. While a large 
part of the population lives under the Taliban’s 
influence and control,13 excluding women 
from these communities in the NAP means 
the plan is detached from the challenges 
faced by women in local villages and districts.
13 Bill Roggio, “Taliban controls or contests 40 
percent of Afghan districts: SIGAR”, FDD’s 
Long War Journal, 1 May 2017, http://www.
longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/05/taliban-
controls-or-contests-40-percent-of-afghan-
districts-sigar.php
6strategy came into effect after the NAP 
was finalised and approved by the National 
Unity Government in June 2015. If the 
M&E strategy was incorporated into the 
NAP, it would have been more specific and 
results-oriented; the issue of the lack of a 
baseline could have been addressed as well. 
Furthermore, the draft didn’t accompany 
an action plan or implementation strategy. 
Since the process has taken years, many 
people changed positions, and a different 
group than those who drafted the Afghan 
NAP developed the implementation strategy 
much later in the process.
The NAP raises huge expectations, as it 
claims to achieve so many objectives, from 
women’s inclusion in peace and security 
agendas, elections, and judicial structures, 
to combating gender-based violence and 
providing psychosocial support, from relief 
and recovery programmes for refugees 
and vulnerable women to the provision of 
education and higher education opportunities 
for women. However, as the implementation 
strategy and indicators indicate, there is a 
distinct lack of clarity about how these 
objectives will be achieved and what level 
of resources can be committed by the 
government and its international partners.
Finalisation and  
Adoption Process
The Afghan NAP was adopted in June 
2015 by the President of the National Unity 
Government (NUG) in Kabul as an effort 
to boost the inclusion and participation of 
women within national peace and security 
frameworks.14 The adoption came after a 
lengthy process of finalisation by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and its international partners.
There has been criticism of the delayed 
finalisation of the plan. There are also 
concerns expressed by various women’s 
organisations and activists that the NAP 
needed to have more substance and deeper 
analysis of the current challenges of women 
within the country, as well as concrete 
actions by the NUG to improve the situation 
and condition of Afghan women.
Although the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 
Commission, and the Women’s Commission 
of Parliament have developed plans and 
strategies to combat violence against women, 
promote women’s rights, and ensure their 
inclusion in the national and local processes, 
little has been drawn from these documents 
during the finalisation process of the NAP. 
For example, the Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs15 developed a comprehensive National 
Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan 
(NAPWA) and they are critical that NAPWA 
was not incorporated into the NAP. The two 
plans do not synchronise, even though both 
have the same goal: women’s empowerment 
in Afghanistan.
Likewise, similar concerns have been raised 
by the female members of the High Peace 
Council,16 whose initial mandate was to ensure 
women’s voices are part of the national peace 
process. These women have been allowed 
minimal contributions into the development 
and finalisation of the Afghan NAP. They had 
recommended that, since the High Peace 
Council had also been engaged in outreach 
activities to foster women’s participation 
in the peace process, the NAP needed to 
ensure that their contributions and roles are 
also recognised and documented. The Plan 
does not include clear procedures to involve 
and engage women in peace negotiations 
with the Taliban and other conflict actors, 
resolutions, and reconciliations at every stage.
The plan remains a ‘wish list of many 
dreams’, with little clarity on the achievable 
indicators as well as a clear milestone due to 
lack of the current situation analysis. While a 
limited number of civil society representatives 
participated17 in the finalisation process, 
many women’s organisations criticised 
the lack of consultation in, and resulting 
exclusion from, the process.
14 See “Afghanistan enacts National Action 
Plan on Women, Peace and Security”, Nobel 
Women’s Initiative, 14 July 2015, https://
nobelwomensinitiative.org/afghanistan-
enacts-national-action-plan-on-women-
peace-and-security/
15 Interview with the former Director of 
Planning at the Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
in Kabul, March 2017.
16 Interview with two female members of the 
High Peace Council in Kabul, March 2017.
17 The Afghan Women’s Network has around 
100 members and participated in the drafting 
and finalisation process. Many women’s 
organisations that are not members of the 
Network believe they were not consulted and 
included in the process. Interview with Ms 
Saqeb in Kabul, March 2017.
PARTICIPATION, PROTECTION, PREVENTION AND RELIEF  
AND RECOVERY
The Afghan NAP is built on the foundation 
that UNSCR 1325 is relevant to the situation 
of Afghanistan, which is going through state 
building, transitional processes, women’s 
empowerment and political participation. The 
agendas set out in UNSCR 1325 are seen to be 
of critical importance and use to the context of 
Afghanistan and therefore Afghanistan obligates 
itself to the following measures under each of the 
four ‘pillars’ of the UNSCR 1325:
Participation:
•  Increase effective participation of women in 
the decision-making and executive levels of 
the Civil Service;
•  Women’s active and effective participation in 
leadership positions in security agencies;
•  Ensuring women’s effective participation in the 
peace process;
•  Encouraging women’s meaningful participation 
in the drafting of strategies and policies on 
peace and security;
•  Strengthening women’s active participation 
in elections.
Protection:
•  The protection of women from all forms of 
violence and discrimination through the 
enforcement, monitoring, and amendment of 
existing laws and development of new laws 
and policies;
•  Women’s human rights are promoted through 
gender mainstreaming of laws, policies, and 
institutional reforms;
•  Providing for an enabling environment for 
women to have access to justice through their 
effective participation in the judiciary;
•  The protection of women from all forms 
of violence through awareness raising and 
public outreach;
•  Health, psychological, and social support is 
available for survivors of violence throughout 
Afghanistan;
•  Special measures are in place ensuring women’s 
protection from sexual violence.
Prevention:
•  Prevention of violence against women;
•  The elimination of the culture of impunity 
surrounding violence against women;
•  Strengthen the role of women in the security 
sector and judicial structures;
•  Gender-related reforms in the security and 
justice sector;
•  Involve men and boys in the fight against all 
forms of violence against women;
•  Increase awareness among women of their 
rights and their role in preventing violence and 
resolving conflict.
Relief and Recovery:
•  Provision of relief and recovery services for 
women affected by conflict, internally displaced 
persons (IDP), and women survivors of violence;
•  Increasing rural women’s economic security 
through increased employment opportunities;
•  The social and economic needs of women are 
considered in the design, implementation, and 
evaluation of relief and recovery programmes;
•  Girls and women’s increased access to education, 
healthcare services, and employment, 
particularly for refugees, the internally displaced, 
and returnees;
•  The implementation of the IDP policy provisions 
related to UNSCR 1325.
While these actions and measures are of great 
importance for achieving gender equality in the 
country, implementation continues to be the 
critical aspect of the NAP. The NAP is divided into 
two phases. The first phase is commencement, 
from 2015-2018, and the second phase, from 
2019-2022, is for implementation: to see changes 
in the situation of Afghan women.
8CONNECTING THE LOCAL 
TO THE NATIONAL
Afghanistan is clearly divided between urban 
and rural communities. While the urban 
communities living in big cities like Kabul, 
Mazar, Hirat, Nangrahar, and Kandahar 
have had a basic access to education, health 
facilities, jobs, and most importantly state 
institutions, the rural communities have run 
on their own during the years of civil war and 
beyond. They have been governed under the 
Jirga or Shura rule, which empowers tribal 
leaders and elders based on their wealth, 
identity, ancestors’ name and fame, and/
or even based on their ties with the armed 
groups. During recent years, the Taliban 
strengthened their grip on the affairs of 
rural areas and took advantage of the lack 
of state institutions in those communities, 
established their writ deciding the face of 
civil and criminal disputes. Communities 
conformed having no other options.18
Contemporary research claims that around 
70-80 per cent of Afghans live in rural 
areas with minimal or no contact with state 
institutions or access to basic services. In such 
circumstances, where women are entirely 
illiterate, do not have any access to health 
and education, nor any community level 
engagement, the idea of a National Action 
Plan remains alien. However, there is not 
adequate data due to the lack of access 
to most of the rural areas to generalise 
this assumption to the larger population 
of the country; this lack of data prevents a 
thorough assessment of the ‘localisation’ of 
the NAP and the traction of the WPS agenda 
in Afghanistan more broadly.
While the NAP is considered a national plan, 
it clearly lacks all the elements required to 
connect the grassroots engagements of 
women’s leaders and women’s groups to the 
central government institutions. The security 
situation and lack of mobility in different 
parts of the country are major challenges 
for the government, the international 
community, and even the women-led 
NGOs based in Kabul, and connections with 
local women’s organisations has not been 
established in a systematic manner.
The changing nature of conflict is evident 
in Afghanistan: from an insurgency towards 
brutal killing of civilians and women in 
particular, to radicalisation of young men 
with violent extremism ideologies which 
continues to happen at the local levels. 
These issues have not made their way into 
the NAP’s situational analysis or measures 
to change. 
Another missing link is that between the 
NAP and all the other parallel and allied 
WPS-focused programmes and projects run 
by international partners, NGOs, and local 
women’s organisations. These should have 
been incorporated into the implementation 
plan, to ensure that there is a coordinated 
and coherent effort for the realisation of 
women’s meaningful participation. So 
many ad hoc WPS-related activities by the 
international community and NGOs are 
currently underway and are not synchronised 
with the NAP.
18 Kara Jensen, “Obstacles to Accessing the 
State Justice System in Rural Afghanistan”, 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 18 
(2) (2011): 929-950.
+ 
The plan remains a ‘wish list of many dreams’, 
with little clarity on the achievable indicators as 
well as a clear milestone due to lack of the current 
situation analysis. While a limited number of civil 
society representatives participated in the finalisation 
process, many women’s organisations criticised the 
lack of consultation in, and resulting exclusion from, 
the process.
IMPLEMENTATION, 
MONITORING AND 
EVALUATION
Security remains the number one challenge 
for the implementation of the NAP at the 
provincial and local levels where insurgency 
is taking shape and continues to recruit and 
arm thousands of young Afghans. Many of 
the provinces and communities that are under 
direct threat of insurgency were prevented 
from engaging in the consultation process 
around the NAP in the first place. Today, as per 
the reports from the Special Inspector General 
for Afghanistan’s Reconstruction (SIGAR), the 
Taliban contest and influence around 40 per 
cent of the territory of Afghanistan19 and that 
makes it almost impossible for the Afghan 
government and international community to 
implement the NAP nationally. However, the 
local civil society groups and organisations that 
are established at the provincial levels might be 
the right platform for implementation because 
they are able to engage in outreach with their 
own communities and since they come from 
the same communities, the threats of the 
Taliban will be lesser to them than to those 
groups and organisations coming from Kabul.
Another challenge for implementation 
remains the lack of resources. It took the 
Ministry of Finance more than two years to 
finalise the costing of the NAP as per the 
donors’ requirements. Even now, at the 
time of writing this paper, the costing is not 
finalised between the Afghan government 
and the donors. While the NAP was being 
developed, Afghanistan had more than 
150,000 international forces engaged as 
part of the NATO/ISAF coalition forces which 
rapidly transitioned into less than 15,000 in 
2016 and 2017; this has a huge impact on the 
level of resources that come to Afghanistan as 
part of military or development aid packages, 
as most of the funds that came to Afghanistan 
were part of the international community’s 
military engagement. The Nordic countries 
– mainly Finland and the European Union – 
remain the main supporters of the NAP.
Before the Brussels-Afghanistan Conference, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced 
the first report on the implementation of 
the Afghan NAP to gauge the attention of 
the international partners and donors,20 
although implementation has not yet 
started officially because of the funding 
challenges. MOFA’s progress report 
illustrates the progress made, and initiatives 
undertaken, by the government and by 
international partners as well as NGOs 
and women’s groups, for the promotion 
and inclusion of women in the peace 
and security structures of the country, as 
19 Bill Roggio, “Taliban controls or contests 40 
percent of Afghan districts: SIGAR”, FDD’s 
Long War Journal, 1 May 2017, http://www.
longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/05/taliban-
controls-or-contests-40-percent-of-afghan-
districts-sigar.php
20 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Progress Report on 
Women’s Status and Empowerment and 
National Action Plan (NAP 1325) (Kabul, 
Afghanistan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2016), http://mfa.gov.af/Content/Media/
Documents/Progress_Report_on_Women_
Rights1610201610265714553325325.pdf
Wazhma Frogh and other activists at a protest against the Taliban’s stoning of a woman 
in Parwan province, 2011.
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well as gender mainstreaming within the 
government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Finance have been 
working for the past two years to finalise 
the NAP budget following its adoption by 
the President. However, there is a general 
consensus among government and the 
women’s organisations in Afghanistan that 
for many activities of gender mainstreaming 
there isn’t a need for additional budgets 
because the government agencies have 
already been obliged to ensure gender 
mainstreaming and women’s empowerment 
in their operations and programmes that 
will directly impact the implementation of 
the NAP.
It’s important to note that the Afghan 
government has appointed a number of 
women to leadership and management 
positions in the cabinet, as the governors, 
judges, prosecutors, and has increased 
efforts to raise the number of women in the 
police and army. All this has been part of the 
lobby and advocacy work by the women’s 
groups and activists with the President and 
the First Lady of the country.
The NAP provides a list of objectives, actions, 
and expected results and indicators. It also 
clarifies the role of the lead agencies and 
the supporting agencies for implementation 
of each activity. The plan envisions that 
whole government agencies will ensure that 
UNSCR 1325 provisions are incorporated 
into their work and also has identified a set 
of actions for each government ministry or 
agency. However, a specific implementation 
plan, with clear timeline and budget is still 
not in place to implement the NAP in a 
successful manner. Women’s organisations 
and activists continue to lobby for the 
finalisation of the budget and the costing 
process. These same women are also 
asking the government for a monitoring 
and evaluation plan to ensure that activities 
implemented are able to bring positive 
changes into the lives of Afghan women.
A responsive M&E system based on results 
would require the NAP to have concrete 
outcomes, resources for the implementation, 
and organisational structures for better 
implementation. Clear and transparent 
planning, monitoring, and community 
consultation processes will allow civil society 
organisations to evaluate and measure the 
impact of the indicators set out in the NAP.
+ 
While the NAP is considered a national plan, it clearly 
lacks all the elements required to connect the grassroots 
engagements of women’s leaders and women’s groups 
to the central government institutions.
CONCLUSION AND WAYS 
FORWARD
The Afghan NAP is an important document 
for the women of Afghanistan. The country 
continues to suffer terribly as a result of the 
conflicts and atrocities by the Taliban, local 
warlords, and armed groups, as well as 
international and regional terrorist groups. 
Women are a target group for all these 
perpetrators of violence, not least because 
they are considered to be agents of change 
and therefore a threat to existence of the 
war and insurgency altogether. 
As the country is moving towards reforms 
and improving institutional capacities, the 
role and contributions of women should 
not be ignored. The NAP, if implemented 
properly, will enable a relatively positive 
inclusion and participation of women into 
the national processes for peace building 
and democratic changes.
The key challenges in the process have 
been two-fold: first, the NAP lacked an 
inclusive drafting process, producing a 
document that lacks clarity around timeline, 
implementation plan, and impact measures, 
and which does not include an established 
baseline assessment; and, second, the 
NAP lacks connection between local 
people’s efforts around peace building and 
community engagements.
As outlined above, there are other concerns 
around implementation that are preventing 
the realisation of the ‘many dreams’ 
recorded in the NAP. These challenges 
pose great concerns for successful 
implementation of the WPS agenda. As a 
first priority, however, the budget and the 
implementation plan need to be finalised 
by the government so that implementation 
can begin. The government needs to 
ensure that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
as a central coordinating body, has the 
required capacity and the political will to 
ensure that all relevant actors are part of 
the implementation processes and a clear 
reporting procedure should be devised to 
inform the public on the results.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
 
1. While the Afghan 
NAP is already developed 
and adopted, and the 
implementation plan 
is not yet public, it is 
important for the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to 
engage a larger group 
of experts, activists, and 
women at the local level in 
the implementation plan. 
This group should be able 
to prioritise the objectives 
and indicators that can be 
achieved during the first 
NAP phase, which is active 
until 2022. 
2. The budget and the 
costing for new activities 
under the NAP should 
be finalised as soon as 
possible since it is already 
late; Afghanistan was 
supposed to start the 
implementation of the 
NAP in the second half of 
2015. The budget could 
include the prioritised 
activities and indicators 
for the next five years.
3. Afghanistan’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affair should 
re-activate the Steering 
Committee meetings 
and the Technical 
Working Group meetings 
to coordinate the 
implementation of NAP-
related activities. These 
activities are currently 
being undertaken by 
government agencies and 
civil society organisations 
but are not recognised as 
part of the official Afghan 
NAP budget and costing 
procedures. These are 
off-budget activities for 
NGOs and civil society 
organisations. 
4. Besides the official 
representatives of the 
government agencies 
in these groups and 
meetings, a number of 
women’s organisations, 
activists, and experts need 
to be included so they 
provide technical advice 
as well as more reliable 
updates about the realities 
on the ground in areas 
that are not accessible to 
government officials.
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